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WHAT TO DO WITH OMAR KHADR?
PUTTING A CHILD SOLDIER ON TRIAL:
QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,

JUVENILE JUSTICE, AND MORAL
CULPABILITY
CHRISTOPHER L. DORE*
I.

INTRODUCTION

I'm tired of hearing how he is the victim. Who is the victim here? My
daughter and son, they are the true victims in this horrible mess.

Tabitha Speer, wife of Sergeant Christopher Speer'
I'd like to know what they expected him to do, come up with his
hands in the air? I mean it's a war. They're shooting at him. Why
can't he shoot at you? If you killed three, why can't he kill one? Why
does nobody say you killed three of his friends? Why does everybody
say you killed an American soldier. Big deal.
2
Maha Elsamnah Khadr, mother of Omar Khadr

A. Death on the Battlefield
Sergeant Christopher Speer thought everyone in the
compound was dead. 3 Moments before, an air strike leveled the
building, ending the gunfire and leaving only the silence of the
Afghan mountainside. 4 But, the sight of a young boy tossing a

* J.D. Candidate, May 2009. The author would like to thank the 2008-2009
Editorial Board of THE JOHN MARSHALL LAW REVIEW for their hard work in
publishing this Comment. Additionally, the author would like to recognize his
parents, John and Nancy Dore, for their endless support and guidance. Last,
the author wishes to thank Kat Leahy for being his most important advisor
and editor, both on and off the page.
1. Michael Friscolanti, Khadr's Case: Who is the Real Victim Here?,
MACLEANS, June 18, 2007, available at http://www.macleans.ca/article.jsp?
content=20070618_106209_106209&source=srch.
2. Frontline: Son of Al Qaeda, Terence McKenna Interview with Maha
Elsamnah and Zaynab Khadr, (PBS television broadcast Apr. 22, 2004)
(transcript
available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
khadr/interviews/mahazaynab.html).
3. See Jeff Tietz, The Unending Torture of Omar Khadr, ROLLING STONE
MAGAZINE, Aug. 24, 2007, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/
story/11 128331/followomarkhadr from an_al-qaedachildhoodtoagitmo_
cell (providing a detailed account of the battle and Omar's capture).
4. Id.
1281
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grenade from the rubble changed all that. The shrapnel pierced
Speer's helmet, and then his brain, dropping him to the ground. 5
He never regained consciousness and died ten days later. 6 Speer's
fellow soldiers shot the boy three times in the chest, but then
administered aid that saved his life.7 After taking him into
custody, the military identified the boy as Omar Khadr, a fifteenyear-old Canadian citizen.8 His capture in July of 2002 marked
the beginning of a harrowing journey into the heart of United
States terrorism policy, but one that his upbringing set in motion
long before.
This Comment will argue that Omar was a child soldier,
indoctrinated with a radical strain of Islam by his family and
surroundings. As a child soldier, he possesses a lower degree of
moral culpability for his crimes. Because of this status, the United
States should not prosecute him, or, if it does, he should not be
eligible for a life sentence without parole. 9 Part II of this
Comment details Omar's family background, from his birth in
1986, to his current custody and prosecution status. Part II will
also provide an overarching view of the child soldier problem
worldwide, with specific attention given to the Middle East. Part
III analyzes the applicable international law pertaining to child
soldiers and children generally. This Comment contrasts this body
of law with the current state of juvenile 10 justice in the United
States, focusing specifically on life-without-parole (LWOP)
sentences for juveniles accused of murder. Additionally, Part III
examines the growing body of neurological and psychological
research arguing that juvenile brains are distinctly different from
adult brains, which, in turn, impairs juvenile reasoning and moral
judgment.

5. Friscolanti, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. See Morris v. Khadr, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1326 (D. Utah 2006)

(holding the Khadr family civilly liable to the Speer and Morris families, as
well as providing details of the battle). Upon reaching Omar, the medics were
not only surprised to hear him speak English, but more so that he begged
them to kill him. 60 Minutes: The Youngest Terrorist? (CBS television
broadcast Nov. 18, 2007) (transcript available at LexisNexis, CBS News
Transcripts) [hereinafter 60 Minutes].

8. Tietz, supra note 3; see also Isabel Vincent, The Good Son, NATIONAL
POST, Dec. 28, 2002 (tracing Omar's life and providing details of the battle and
his capture).
9. Life-without-parole (LWOP) involves a jail sentence for the remainder
of one's natural life, without the possibility, option, or opportunity for release.
Life with parole allows periodic chances for release, but there is no guarantee
of eventual parole.
10. Throughout this Comment, the terms juvenile, adolescent, minor, and

child will be used interchangeably to represent any person under the age of
eighteen.

2008]

What to Do With Omar Khadr?

1283

Part IV proposes reform to both international and United
States domestic law in order to guarantee uniformity in juvenile
criminal law and ensure proper weight is given to diminished
juvenile culpability. This reform includes signing, supporting, and
abiding by all relevant international law pertaining to children
and child soldiers, specifically those laws which endorse eighteen
as the minimum age for military participation. In abiding by
international law, the United States must prohibit LWOP for
juveniles domestically and apply a broader understanding of
diminished juvenile culpability throughout its justice system.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Growing up Al Qaeda
Living in Toronto in 1986, Ahmed Said Khadr, an Egyptian,
and his wife Maha Elsamnah, a Palestinian, welcomed the fourth
of what would be six children, naming him Omar.1 Two years
later, the Khadr family moved to Peshawar, Pakistan, an
operational outpost of Islamic insurgents in Afghanistan's battle
against the Soviet Union. 12 Omar's father took a position with a
Canadian charity named Human Concern International (HCI), set
up to aid orphans of the Afghan/Soviet war.1 3 An emerging leader
in this resistance, Osama Bin Laden, based his new militant army,
Al Qaeda, in Peshawar.14 During this time, Ahmed Said built a
friendship with Bin Laden, and it is widely believed that Ahmed
Said's position with HCI was a personal fagade.15 United States
intelligence alleges that through a second organization, Health
and Education Project International-Canada, he participated in Al
16
Qaeda fundraising and recruitment.

11. Vincent, supra note 8.
Omar has three brothers (Abdullah,
Abdurahman, and Abdul Karim) and two sisters (Zaynab and Mariam). Id.
12. Vincent, supra note 8.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.; see also Charging Brief, United States v. Khadr, No. 07-001 (USMC
Feb. 2, 2007) (claiming in regards to Ahmed Said's organization: "despite
stated goals of providing humanitarian relief to Afghani orphans, [it] provided
funds to Al Qaeda to support terrorist training camps in Afghanistan.").

1284
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In Pakistan, Omar and his siblings enrolled in a madrassah1 7
and spent four years living among the war refugees.1 8 In 1992,
Ahmed Said stepped on a land mine and was nearly killed. 19 His
connections to Al Qaeda were unknown at the time and the
Canadian government flew him and his family back to Canada for
medical treatment. 20 Once healed, Ahmed Said brought his family
back to Pakistan and resumed his position at HCI.21
In 1996, the Pakistani government arrested Ahmed Said for
his financial involvement in the 1995 Egyptian embassy bombing
in Islamabad, Pakistan, 22 outing his connections to Ayman al
Zawahiri 23 and the Al Qaeda network for the first time. 24 He spent
four months in a Pakistani prison under squalid conditions and
was only released after intervention by the Canadian
government. 25 The Pakistani government also held Omar and his
family for a short time. 26 Omar, who was very close to his father,
was said to be "traumatized" and "radicalized" by the whole ordeal,
27
and at the age of ten, was "marked for life."
After his release from prison, Ahmed Said again moved his
family, this time landing in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, at the
expansive compound of Osama Bin Laden. 28 Ahmed Said sent
Omar and his two older brothers, Abdullah and Abdurahman, to

17. Madrassah, an Arabic word, means school, specifically with an Islamic
based education. In the United States vocabulary, the word has become
synonymous with training grounds for Islamic extremism. However, this is an
over-inclusive perception, as not all madrassahs are linked to militant Islamic
thought. See Extremist Madrassahs,Ghost Schools, and U.S. Aid to Pakistan:
Are We Making the Grade on the 9/11 Commission Report Card? Hearing
Before H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform Subcomm. on National
Security and ForeignAffairs 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Lisa A. Curtis),
at
http://nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/
available
20070509164319.pdf (discussing the current status of madrassahs in
Pakistan, and the implications for United States educational aid in the
region).
18. Tietz, supra note 3.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1995, at A3, Foreign Desk (reporting that a
suicide bomber rammed a pickup truck packed with explosives into the gate of
the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, killing fifteen people and
wounding fifty-nine others).
23. Zawahiri is believed to be the "operational brains" behind the
September 11th attacks and the number two commander of Al Qaeda under
Osama Bin Laden. Profile: Ayman al-Zawahiri,BBC NEWS, Sept 27, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/1560834.stm.
24. Vincent, supra note 8.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Tietz, supra note 3.
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an Al Qaeda training camp nearby. 29 There, they received both
religious and military training. 30 During this time, their father
attempted to turn Abdurahman into a suicide bomber and made
explicit threats on his life about the consequences of selling out Al
Qaeda. 31
The Khadrs were living at Bin Laden's compound when
suicide bombers destroyed the American Embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania. 32 They were also there to see the retaliatory cruise
missiles sent by the United States, which killed and wounded
dozens. 33 Likewise, they were at the compound on September 11,
2001, when Al Qaeda fighters attacked the United States, killing
nearly three thousand American civilians. 34
Knowing that
retaliation from the United States was imminent, the Khadrs and
others abandoned the compound. 35
Abdurahman, Omar's
nineteen-year-old brother, disillusioned with the killing of
civilians, left his family and began his own journey into United
36
States custody, and, allegedly, into the service of the CIA.
29. Id.
30. Id.; Charging Brief, supra note 16, at 29.
31. See Frontline: Son of Al Qaeda, Terence McKenna Interview with
Abdurahman Khadr, (PBS television broadcast April 22, 2004), (transcript
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbhlpages/frontline/shows/khadr/
interviews/khadr.html)
[hereinafter
Frontline].
In
the
interview,
Abdurahman states:
two times ... my father himself tried to get me to become a suicide
bomber. He sat me down with the Al Qaeda scholar, he sat me down
with the person to train people to become suicide bombers. He sat me
down with these two people and tried to convince me to become a suicide
bomber. He's like, you know, you'd be our pride in this family, you'd be
our pride if you do this.
Id.
Later in the interview, Abdurahman states that as a disobedient seventeenyear-old, his father told him, "[i]f you ever betrayed Islam or if you ever sell
out on us for anyone else, I will be the one to kill you. If you do something
wrong, in Islam law, you're supposed to be killed. Before anyone else, I'll kill
you." Id.
32. Al Qaeda detonated two truck-bombs on August 7, 1998, destroying the
United States Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,
leaving 257 dead and injuring more than 5,000 people. Usinfo.state.gov, U.S.
Embassy Bombings, http://usinfo.state.gov/is/international-security/ terrorism
/embassy.bombings.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
33. Tietz, supra note 3.
34. Id. See First Video of Pentagon 9/11 Attack Released, CNN, May 16,
2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/05/16/pentagon.video/index.html
(recounting the events of the September 11, 2001 attacks).
35. Tietz, supranote 3.
36. Frontline, supra note 31. In this extensive interview, Abdurahman
describes his decision to leave his family in 2001, stating, "[i]f you go back to
your family, what are you going to get? All you're going to get is running up
and down hills, valleys, staying in mud huts, running for the rest of your life
until you get shot. And I didn't want that anymore." Id. According to his
account, shortly after leaving his family, the Northern Alliance (a political-
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Unlike his brother, Omar followed his father into the
37
mountains with Al Qaeda fighters and prepared for an invasion.
At some point, Omar's father sent him to act as a translator with a
group of Al Qaeda fighters, and on July 27, 2002, Omar found
himself barricaded with four others in a building outside of Khost,
Afghanistan.3 8 Based on a local tip, fifty United States soldiers
surrounded the building.3 9 Those inside rebuffed requests to
surrender with gunfire, and after several hours of trading shots,
40
the soldiers instructed the Air Force to destroy the building.
41
Everyone inside, except Omar, was killed.
While Omar
sustained a head injury that would later claim his left eye, he was
alive, awake, and armed when Sergeant Speer and others
approached the wreckage. Omar rose up, and, in what he likely
42
thought was his last act on earth, threw a live grenade.
Omar's gunshot wounds did not kill him and he soon arrived
at Bagram Air Force Base. He spent four months at the base,
receiving sporadic medical treatment in tandem with heavy
interrogation. 43 In October of 2002, after his sixteenth birthday,
the military transferred Omar to the Cuba-based Guantanamo
Bay detention facility. 44 There, the military placed him in a

military organization in Afghanistan) captured him and turned him over to
the United States military. He began cooperating with the military, and
states that after September 11th, "we were put away in jail ... I started
registering stuff more as a normal person. Well, actually not a normal
person-a person totally against Al Qaeda. My mentality changed from an
anti-American, anti-Northern Alliance to an anti-Al Qaeda." Id. Abdurahman
further asserts that after a short period in jail, the CIA approached him with a
job offer: $3,000 a month to provide intelligence and engage in espionage. Id.
Allegedly, the CIA then sent him to Guantanamo as an inside spy, where he
stayed in the general population, and then private quarters, for five months.
Id. Following his time there, he alleges that the CIA sent him to Bosnia in
order to infiltrate the network sending foreign fighters to Iraq. The CIA sent
him back to Canada after he expressed a serious concern for his safety. Id.
The CIA refuses to comment on his story. Id.
37. Vincent, supra note 8.
38. Id.; see also 60 Minutes, supra note 7 (quoting Abdurahman as saying
his father sent Omar to act as a translator).
39. Vincent, supranote 8
40. Tietz, supra note 3.
41. Id.; Morris, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1326.
42. Id.
43. Richard Wilson, Military Commissions in Guantanamo Bay: Giving
Full and Fair Trial a Bad Name, 10 GONZ. J. INT'L 63, 65 (2007). At the time
of his capture, Omar could not grow a beard, his wisdom teeth had not yet
come in, and he had not yet physically finished puberty. Muneer Ahmad,
Guantanamo is Here: The Military Commissions Act and Noncitizen
Vulnerability, 2007 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 1, 3 (2007). Authors Wilson and Ahmad
have special insight into Omar's case, as they were his legal representation
until mid-2007.
44. Tietz, supra note 3.
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solitary cell within the adult population. 45
Nearly two years later, Omar finally received access to legal
counsel. 46 Through these attorneys, Omar reported that the
Guantanamo guards and intelligence officers subjected him to a
variety of abuses and methods of torture.47 The public heard
Omar's own voice discuss his ordeal in July of 2008 after the
Canadian Supreme Court ordered Canadian intelligence officials
to release video of their agents interrogating Omar at

45. Id.
46. Wilson, supra note 43, at 65.
47. See Tietz, supra note 3 (detailing a specific incident involving military
interrogators and Omar). Omar alleges that his interrogators shackled his
hands to his feet behind his back, creating a stress position by bending him
backwards. Id. His guards left him in this position for several hours. Id. He
eventually urinated on himself and when
[t]he MPs returned, [they] mocked him for a while and then poured
pine-oil solvent all over his body. Without altering his chains, they
began dragging him by his feet through the mixture of urine and pine
oil. Because his body had been so tightened, the new motion racked it.
The MPs swung him around and around, the piss and solvent washing
up into his face. The idea was to use him as a human mop .... He was
not allowed a change of clothes for two days.
Id.
Muneer Ahmad, Omar's former attorney, corroborates this event. Ahmad,
supra note 43, at 3.
Omar also experienced a fifteen hour plane flight from Afghanistan to
Guantanamo, in which he was
shackled hand and foot, a waist chain cinching his hands to his stomach,
another chain connecting the shackles on his hands to those on his
feet ... Omar was forced into sensory-deprivation gear that the military
uses to disorient prisoners prior to interrogation. The guards pulled
black thermal mittens onto Omar's hands and taped them hard at the
wrists. They pulled opaque goggles over his eyes and placed soundproof
earphones over his ears. They put a deodorizing mask over his mouth
and nose. They bolted him, fully trussed, to a backless bench.
Tietz, supranote 3.
His older brother Abdurahman, who took the same trip to Guantanamo Bay,
corroborates this account. See Frontline, supra note 31, at 23 (detailing his
experience of being shackled, sensory-deprived, kept in painful positions for
hours, and physically beaten for any type of movement). Further allegations
of mistreatment are laid out in O.K. v. Bush, 377 F. Supp. 2d 102, 106-09
(D.D.C. 2005). See also Jo Becker, The War on Teen Terror, SALON, June 24,
2008, available at http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2008/06/24/juveniles
_at-gitmo/ (reporting that military records showed that during a fourteen day
period in May, 2004, eighteen year old Mohammed Jawad (brought to
Guantanamo at age sixteen) was "moved from cell to cell 112 times, usually
left in one cell for less than three hours before being shackled and moved to
another. Between midnight and 2 a.m. he was moved more frequently to
ensure maximum disruption of sleep.").
Jawad attempted suicide eleven
months after arriving at Guantanamo, and another fifteen year old,
Mohammad El Gharani, has attempted suicide seven times. Id. This article
also notes that the Guantanamo detainees younger than fifteen were released
to UNICEF in Afghanistan for rehabilitation. Id.
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Guantanamo. In the video, while crying and asking for help,
Omar claims he was tortured and lifts his shirt to show the
wounds he claims he received while being tortured at Bagram Air
force base shortly after his capture. 48
Alternate sources
49
corroborate Omar's ongoing injuries in 2003.
Meanwhile, more juvenile prisoners were arriving at
Guantanamo, some as young as ten. 50 After spending twenty-eight
months in solitary confinement, the United States charged Omar
with Murder in Violation of the Law of War and four lesser
51
charges.
Omar and eight other prisoners were the first selected for
trial by military commission in 2005.52 However, a June 2006
48. Jorge Barrera & Steven Edwards, Interrogation Video Shows Khadr
Crying, Pulling Hair, THE NATIONAL POST, July 15, 2008, available at
http://www.nationalpost.com/story.html?id=654434 (discussing video segments
shot around Feb. 13, 2003); see also Transcript: Video Showing Omar Khadr
Released

by

Lawyers,

THE

NATIONAL

POST,

available

at

http://network.nationalpost.com/npblogs/posted/
archive/2008/07/15/videoshowing-omar-khadr-released-by-lawyers.aspx (quoting Omar as saying, when
lifting his shirt: "is this healthy? I can't move my arm. I requested medical
over a long time. They don't do anything about it. [Covers his face and
sobs.] ... You're not here. [Cries.] I lost my eyes. I lost my feet, everything.").
49. Melissa A. Jamison, Detention of Juvenile Enemy Combatants at
GuantanamoBay: The Special Concerns of the Children,9 U.C. DAVIS. J. Juv.
L. & POL'Y 127, 138-40 (2005) (recounting that Omar lost ninety percent of his
vision in his left eye and that his shoulder wounds were continuously
infected).
50. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE THREAT
OF A BAD EXAMPLE: UNDERMINING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AS "WAR ON
TERROR"
DETENTIONS
CONTINUE
(2003),
http://web.amnesty.org/

library/Index/ENGAMR511142003 (last visited Aug. 24, 2008). While at
Guantanamo, the military held the youngest juveniles in a separate facility
under much more amenable conditions than Omar ever received.
See
GlobalSecurity.org,
Guantanamo
Bay
Camp
Delta,
http://
www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/guantanamo-bay-delta.htm
(last
visited Aug. 24, 2008) (detailing the conditions for younger prisoners). The
military released the youngest of these detainees by 2007. Jamison, supra
note 49.
51. Attempted Murder in Violation of the Law of War, Conspiracy,
Providing Material Support for Terrorism, and Spying. Charging Brief, supra
note 16, at 25-34.
52. Guantanamo Bay Detainees Charged by Military Commissions, THE
WASHINGTON
POST
(2007),
http://projects.washingtonpost.com
guantanamo/charged (last visited Oct. 14, 2008). The other detainees were
from several Middle Eastern countries, and were mostly thirty or older. Id.
Out of this original group, Omar was by far the youngest, and the only one
charged with murder. Id. The others have charges ranging from conspiracy to
attempted murder. Id. In October of 2007, the United States charged
Mohammed Jawad with attempted murder. Carol J. Williams, Charges filed
against Guantanamo Inmate, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2007, at A20 available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/octll2/nationlna-gitmol2 (last visited Oct. 14,
2008). He allegedly threw a grenade at a United States military vehicle in
Afghanistan when he was seventeen. Id.

2008]

What to Do With Omar Khadr?

1289

ruling by the United States Supreme Court halted the military
tribunals, forcing the military to drop the charges. 53 In response,
the United States Congress passed the Military Commissions Act
(MCA) in October 2006. 5 4 Under the new legislation, the United
55
States military refiled charges against Omar in February 2007.
Subsequently, in June 2007, the commissions brought Omar up for
arraignment, only to dismiss his case again for lack of jurisdiction
under the MCA.56 Three months later, the United States Court of

53. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that the military
commission lacked the power to proceed because it violated the Uniform Code
of Military Justice and the procedures violated Common Article Three of the
Geneva Conventions, which regulates the treatment of prisoners taken during
armed conflict).
54. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 § 948. This legislation created the
military commissions applicable to prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay.
Controversy over the MCA centered on § 950(j), which amended 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, section (e)(1), by replacing it with:
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien
detained by the United States who has been determined by the United
States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is
awaiting such determination.
Id. § 950 (j). See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), infra note 63
(ruling this provision unconstitutional).
55. Charging Brief, supra note 16. The charges include allegations that
Ahmed said Khadr was a senior Al Qaeda member and that in 2002, Omar
"received one-on-one, private Al Qaeda basic training, consisting of training in
the use of rocket propelled grenades, rifles, pistols, grenades, and explosives."
Id. at T 10. The rationale on which the United States bases its ability to
prosecute Omar and others at Guantanamo Bay is too expansive for this
Comment. However, the Legal Advisor to the Department of State, John
Bellinger, concisely summarizes it, stating,
[iun a normal war, where both sides have a right to engage in combat
with one another, if a soldier kills a soldier on the other side, it's not
murder unless it is done somehow contrary to the laws of war
perfidiously, or killing someone when they are-have already
surrendered. In this case though, the members of the al-Qaeda and the
Taliban, while they may have thought they were defending themselves,
they had no legal right under the laws of war to be engaging in combat.
Any combat that they were engaged in was illegal. And so, as I say,
while they may have thought that they were defending themselves, as
they no doubt thought they were against someone who was shooting
them, nonetheless, the only people who were in the right were U.S. and
coalition forces because we were acting pursuant to a UN resolution in
an act of self-defense against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
Fpc.state.gov, The Upcoming Trial of Omar Khadr at Guantanamo Bay - Press
Conference with John Bellinger, May 29, 2007, http://fpc.state.gov/
fpc/86126.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2008).
56. JUMANA MUSA, REPORT OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S OBSERVER
JUMANA MUSA ON THE ARRAIGNMENT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE MILITARY
COMMISSIONS AT GUANTANAMO ON 4 JUNE 2007 IN THE CASE OF OMAR KHADR
AND SALIM AHMED HAMDAN, June 5, 2007, http://web.amnesty.org/library/

IndexIENGAMR510982007?open&of=ENG-2AM (last visited Aug. 24, 2008).
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Military Commission Review overruled the dismissal and
reinstated Omar's charges. 57 Following this, Omar's lawyers took
their then only available appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, which, for lack of jurisdiction,
denied their motion.58
Following this ruling, the military
arraigned Omar in November 2007; however, the judge postponed
the trial after the prosecution revealed previously withheld
evidence that may prove procedurally "exculpatory" for Omar's
59
defense.

57. William Glaberson, Court Advances Military Trials for Detainees, N.Y.
Sept. 25, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/25/
washington/25gitmo.html.
Omar is now the only prisoner from a Western country left at Guantanamo
and, at the age of twenty-two, has spent a quarter of his life there. Beth
Gorham, Appeals Court Asked to Reconsider Decision on Khadr, GLOBE AND
MAIL, A17, Oct. 2, 2007. The United States sent the other prisoners home
following negotiations brought by their home governments. See Guantanamo
Australian Flies Home, BBC NEWS, May 20, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
asia-pacific/6673557.stm (reporting that prisoner David Hicks would serve the
remainder of his sentence at home in Australia); Five Gitmo Detainees to be
Freed, CNN INTERNATIONAL, Jan. 11, 2005, http://www.cnn.com2005/
WORLD/europe/01/11/uk.guantanamo/index.html (reporting that the United
States would release the four remaining Britons and an Australian from
Guantanamo Bay back to their home countries).
Despite public outcry and criticism from human rights organizations,
Canada, however, has remained silent on Omar's detention. See Amnesty.org,
Open Letter from Amnesty International to Stephen Harper, June 14, 2007,
http://www.amnesty.ca/resource-..centre/news/view.php?load=arcview&article=
3966&c=Resource+Centre+News (last visited Aug. 24, 2008) (urging the
Canadian government to "follow the precedent of other US allies and insist on
the repatriation of Khadr. Like these states, Canada must assert its sovereign
interest by providing diplomatic protection to its citizen."). But see Khadr
Should be Tried on American Soil: Dion, CBC NEWS, Sept. 19, 2007,
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/09/19/national-khadr.html (reporting that
Stephane Dion, the leader of the Liberal Party of Canada, met with Omar's
lawyers and publicly requested that Omar either be tried in the United States
civilian court or be repatriated to Canada. Dion, however, is not in a position
to speak officially on Canadian foreign policy matters). Canada may be wary
to step in and help a member of the Khadr family after helping Omar's father
prior to learning of his Al Qaeda connections. Tietz, supranote 20.
58. Petition for Review, Omar Ahmed Khadr v. United States, The United
States Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit, Oct. 9, 2007;
Khadr v. United States, No. 07-1405, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 26155 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (order denying motion to stay military commission proceeding).
59. See William Glaberson, Decks Are Stacked in War Crime Cases, Lawyers
Say,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
8,
2007,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/09/washington/09gitmo.html (reporting that
military prosecutors notified Omar's defense attorneys of potentially
exculpatory evidence on the eve of his preliminary hearing); see also
Guantanamo Detainee Arraigned in Court Hearing, AM. FORCES PRESS
SERVICE, Nov. 8, 2007, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=48095 (reporting that the potentially exculpatory
evidence includes an eyewitness whose testimony may prove Omar is not an
TIMES,
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Since that ruling, several decisions by multiple courts have
pushed Omar's trial date to November 10, 2008.60 First, Omar's
lawyers sought simultaneous dismissal in the military tribunal
and the D.C. Circuit, asserting that Omar is a child solider, but
both rejected this claim.6 1 Shortly thereafter, Omar's lawyers
brought another challenge in the D.C. Circuit, which was rejected
for lack of jurisdiction. 62 The briefing for this motion, and the
rejection, overlapped with the Supreme Court's ruling in
Boumediene v. Bush, and may have been decided differently based
upon the Court's ruling in that case. The Court's groundbreaking
ruling in Boumediene held that Guantanamo detainees have the
constitutional privilege of habeas corpus, that the Suspension
Clause applies, and that the MCA is an unconstitutional
suspension of the writ. 63 The ruling allows broader challenges for
all detainees in federal district court, including those already set
64
for trial at the military commission such as Omar.
Finally, in May of 2008, the military replaced presiding Judge
Col. Peter Brownback with a judge known for maintaining a
unlawful enemy combatant, but rather a prisoner of war, entitling to him
different legal rights); see also William Glaberson, An Unlikely Antagonist in
the Detainees' Corner, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/19/us/19gitmo.html (reporting that Omar's
defense attorney "highlighted a military report that said another enemy
fighter was still alive in the compound when the grenade was thrown" and
that there was an "American commander's report that said the assailant had
been killed").
60. Becker, supra note 47; Carol Rosenberg, Khadr Gets Post-ElectionTrial
Date,
MIAMI
HERALD,
Sept.
16,
2008,
available
at
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics/campaign-2008/story/688669.html.
61. United States v. Khadr, Ruling on the Defense Motion for Dismissal
Due to Lack of Jurisdiction Under the MCA in Regard to Juvenile Crimes of a
Child
Soldier,
D-022,
(USMC
Apr.
30,
2008),
available at
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp content/uploads/2008/05/Khadr ruling_4-3008.pdf (the tribunal held that "neither customary international law nor
international treaties binding upon the United States prohibit the trial of a
person for alleged violations of the law of nations committed when he was 15
years of age"); Khadr v. Gates, Order, United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, Apr. 21, 2008, 07-1156 (refusing to hear the child
soldier's challenge immediately, and instead scheduling full briefing and
hearing for September 2008).
62. Khadr v. United States, On Respondents' Motion to Dismiss the
Petition for Review for Lack of Jurisdiction, United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, 07-1405, June 20, 2008 (denying motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and ruling that all challenges raised against the
military commission may be addressed after a trial).
63. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229.
64. William Glaberson, Detainee Lawyers to Use Ruling for New Attacks,
N.Y. TIMES, June
14, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/06/14/washington/14gitmo.html (reporting that Omar's defense lawyer
may bring a new federal challenge following the Boumediene ruling on
grounds that because the Court extended habeas rights to Guantanamo,
further Constitutional rights are extended as well).
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"rocket-docket." 65
Omar's case is a non-capital prosecution, leaving LWOP as
the most likely result of a guilty verdict.66 In the alternative, if
the military commission finds Omar innocent, the United States
67
retains the option to keep him at Guantanamo indefinitely.
B. The World- Wide Phenomenon of Child Soldiers
The term child soldier evades a single definition. The most
cited description comes from the Cape Town Principles, which
state, "[a] child associated with an armed force or armed group
refers to any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been
recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any
capacity ....
,,68Going far beyond a mere singular definition, the

65. William Glaberson, Army Judge is Replaced for Trial of Detainee, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com2008/05/31/
washington/3lgitmo.html.
66. Bellinger, supra note 55.
67. Id. In response to a question regarding Omar's possible acquittal, Mr.
Bellinger stated:
as a matter of law, we believe that we may continue to hold someone,
even if they are acquitted, as a matter of law .... Certainly, we
acknowledge that if someone is acquitted after trial, then that raises a
certain expectation that someone might be released. On the other hand,
these individuals are individuals who we believe are-have engaged in
acts of combatancy and that's why they're being held. And so we would
have to look at that if an individual were acquitted.
Id.
68. The full Cape Town definition reads:
A child associated with an armed force or armed group refers to any
person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used
by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not
limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters,
messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a
child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities.
UNICEF, Cape Town Principles and Best Practice on the Prevention of
Recruitment of Children Into the Armed Forces and On Demobilization and
Socialization Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa 8 (1997), available at
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/CapeTown-Principles(1).pdf
[hereinafter
Cape Town Principles].
The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (CSUCS) follows a slightly
varied characterization:
While there is no precise definition, the Coalition considers a child
soldier any person under the age of 18 who is a member of or attached to
government armed forces or any other regular or irregular armed force
or armed political group, whether or not an armed conflict exists. Child
soldiers perform a range of tasks including: participation in combat,
laying mines and explosives; scouting, spying, acting as decoys, couriers
or guards; training, drill or other preparations; logistics and support
functions, portering, cooking and domestic labor. Child soldiers may
also be subjected to sexual slavery or other sexual exploitation.
Child-Soldiers.org,
Questions
&
Answers,
http://www.childsoldiers.org/childsoldiers/questions-and-answers.
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problem itself is expansive, covering an estimated thirty conflict
zones, and encompassing as many as 300,000 juveniles.6 9 Further,
approximately two million children have died in armed conflict
during the last decade, with an estimated six million permanently
disabled. 70 Most child soldier recruitment remains on the African
continent, encompassing at least half of all child soldiers
worldwide. 7' However, the problem extends far beyond these
72
battles into at least fourteen other countries on four continents.
Child soldiers are presently fighting, or were in the past
In
decade, in at least eleven Middle Eastern countries. 73
Palestine, an estimated seventy percent of the first intifada was
made up of young teens. 74 The largest use of child soldiers in the
69. This number is disputed, or more accurately, deemed impossible to
confirm. A 1996 U.N. study estimated the number at 250,000. GRACA
MACHEL, IMPACT OF ARMED CONFLICT ON CHILDREN, Aug. 26, 1996, U.N. Doc.

A/51/306, available at http://www.unicef.org/graca/a5l-306-en.pdf. A 2001
study by CSUCS puts the number at 300,000. HumanRightsWatch.org, Key
Findings of the Global Report on Child Soldiers 2001, http://www.hrw.org/
campaigns/crp/cs-report200l.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2008). Further, in
2005, P.W. Singer estimated that 77 out of 129 non-state armed forces utilized
child soldiers, making the number increasingly hard to estimate. P.W.
SINGER, CHILDREN AT WAR 30 (2005).
REPORT OF
THE SPECIAL
RIGHTS
COUNCIL,
70. U.N.
HUMAN
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR CHILDREN AND ARMED
2, U.N. Doc. AIHRC/4/45 (2007).
CONFLICT, RADHIKA COOMARASWAMY,

71. Conflicts exist in Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Cote
d'Ivoire, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Uganda. MICHAEL WESSELLS, CHILD SOLDIERS,
FROM VIOLENCE TO PROTECTION 10-11 (2006).

72. Colombia, Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Myanmar (Burma),
Philippines, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Russia, Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories,
Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Yemen. Id. For the purpose of this Comment, the focus
will be on child soldiers in the Middle East, as they are most analogous to
Omar's situation. This distinction is not meant to detract from African
conflicts, as they are the most deadly and brutal conflicts of the modern era.
However, those conflicts (mainly Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Sierra Leon, and Uganda) are fought over political control, diamonds, and oil,
and many of the child soldiers are forced to fight. Id. at 12-14. See also DAVID
M. ROSEN, ARMIES OF THE YOUNG: CHILD SOLDIERS IN WAR AND TERRORISM

11 (2005) (noting that in Sierra Leone, the primary aim of the Revolutionary
United Front was the "devastation of the civilian population in order to create
the kind of civil strife and chaos that would bring down the government and
create an opportunity for the exploitation of Sierra Leone's diamond fields.")
What distinguishes the Middle Eastern conflict from others is the underlying
religious motivation, which alters the perceived motivation of child
combatants to take up arms.
73. Algeria, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine,
Sudan, Tajikistan, and Yemen. WESSELLS, supra note 71; SINGER, supra note
69, at 21.
74. Id. As a result, twenty percent of Palestinian deaths in conflict are
under the age of seventeen. Id. See generally ROSEN, supra note 72, at 91-131
(detailing the evolution of the Palestinian resistance and the vital role of youth
participation in its growth). Rosen notes, "[t/he concentration of power and
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Middle East occurred during the deadly Iran-Iraq war where the
Iranian government, under Ayatollah Khomeini, pulled thousands
of children, ages twelve and up, from school to fight in the first
wave of attacks.7 5 More recently, American fighters faced child
soldiers during the Gulf War in Iraq, 76 and have faced child
soldiers fighting with both insurgent and Al Qaeda militias in the
on-going conflict that began in 2003. 7 7 Afghanistan also has a long
history of recruiting child soldiers, dating back to its war with the
authority in the hands of children and youth during the first intifada was
unmistakable." Id. at 116. Rosen further describes the prevalence of
Palestinian Authority sponsored paramilitary camps for youth, the rise of
juvenile suicide bombers, and the overwhelming sense that Palestinian youth
are ready and willing to both fight and die for the cause. Id. at 120.
75. SINGER, supra note 69, at 21-23. As a result, an estimated 100,000
Iranian boys died on the battlefield, with another several hundred thousand
captured. Id. When the Red Cross attempted to repatriate them following the
war, Khomeini rejected their return, stating that they "were meant to die." Id.
at 22.
76. Id. Following the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein formed his own
paramilitary force of young boys, numbering over ten thousand. Id. These
child soldiers were also present against American forces during the 2003
invasion. Id.
77. In the year following the invasion, British forces detained sixty Iraqi
juveniles, while the United States detained one hundred and seven at the
infamous Abu Graib prison. SINGER, supra note 69, at 24; see also U.N.
Reports Children Used as Combatants in Iraq, CNN, Jan. 18, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/01/18/iraq.rights/index.html
(last

visited Aug. 24, 2008) (reporting that "[a] boy said to be aged between 10 and
13 years allegedly carried out a suicide bombing targeting the police
commander in the city of Kirkuk. Later that month, two boys aged 12 and 13
years reportedly carried out attacks against [U.S.-led forces] ..
"); see also
GlobalPolicy.org, Evidence of Insurgents Using Child Soldiers, March 15,
2005,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/consequences
/2005/0315child.htm (last visisted Aug. 24, 2008) (reporting a thirteen-year-old
Iraqi boy was one of twenty-three "receiving daily lessons in how to use
Kalashnikovs and grenades"). The article quotes the boy as saying, "I want to
die as a martyr as my father did. I want to learn how to kill people who
entered our country to kill our parents... [When I hit one of the US guys I
feel that I have learned a true lesson." Id.; see also Alexandra Zavis & Garrett
Therolf, Militants Use Children to do Battle in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2007,
at Al (reporting that eight hundred Iraqi boys were taken into custody, some
as young as eleven). These boys report that "insurgents typically pay [them]
$200 to $300 to plant a bomb, enough to support a family for two or three
months." Id. A new facility was built to house them, and the United States
military reports they are receiving lessons in "basic Arabic, English, math,
geography and science... Iraqi history and new government institutions." Id.
Further, the military reports the boys receive regular psychiatric counseling
and have access to a 4,000-volume library, including Harry Potter translated
into Arabic. Id. Notably, Major General Douglas Stone, the commander of
detainee operations, states that he quickly realized that "most of these young
men are victims not only of Al Qaeda [in Iraq], but also of their own illiteracy.
Because they couldn't read or write, they also couldn't work, and unemployed
young men are also angry young men, susceptible to the cunning arguments of
extremists." Id. (emphasis added).
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Soviet Union, in which children attending Pakistani madrassahs
were recruited across the border. Even more recently, a 2003
study estimated as many as eight thousand child soldiers are still
78
fighting with Taliban and Al Qaeda forces.
III. ANALYSIS
Nine years before Omar Khadr threw his deadly grenade,
Christopher Simmons killed Shirley Crook by throwing her off a
bridge on the outskirts of St. Louis, Missouri. 79 Simmons, then
seventeen, along with two younger accomplices, broke into Crook's
home and tied her up.80 They drove her to a nearby bridge, and
while she was still alive, threw her into the waters below.81 The
police arrested Simmons, tried him as an adult, and the Missouri
Supreme Court eventually confirmed his death sentence.8 2 Seven
years later, Simmons' appeal reached the United States Supreme
Court in the case of Roper v. Simmons.8 3 A five to four holding
overruled his sentence, and, in doing so, prohibited all capital
sentencing for juvenile offenders.8 4 The landmark case was a
success for juvenile advocates and locked into precedent the
Court's recognition of juveniles' lower moral culpability. While
Roper dealt with the death penalty, its implications extend much
further and inform any current juvenile justice discussions within
the United States.
Internationally, the discussion of juvenile justice is framed by
a variety of treaties, but the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC)85 represents the most important. The
CRC is the most widely ratified treaty in the world, with only the
United States and Somalia failing to ratify it.86 Taking force in
1989, the CRC defines a child as anyone under the age of eighteen,
and clearly prohibits both the juvenile death penalty and juvenile
life-without-parole (LWOP).87 Significantly, the Court in Roper

78. SINGER, supra note 69, at 26.
79. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556-57 (2005).
80. Id.

81. Id.
82. State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165 (Mo. 1997).
83. Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.
84. Id. Seventy prisoners on death row, in twelve states, had their
sentences commuted because they had committed their crimes as a juvenile.
Id. at 596.
85. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989,
1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC].
86. UNICEF, CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD (1997), http://
EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE,
www.unicef.org/sowc97/downloadlfctsgrfs.pdf;
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: SENTENCING 13- AND 14-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN TO DIE IN
http://eji.org/eji/files/2OO71017cruelandunusual.pdf
(2007),
PRISON
[hereinafter Equal Justice Initiative].
87. CRC, supra note 85, at art. 1 & art. 37(a).
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looked to the CRC as an international point of guidance when
supporting its finding.8 8 Roper and the CRC frame the foregoing
discussion of juvenile culpability and will be dealt with in detail
below.
A. InternationalLaw Governing Juveniles and Child Soldiers
In 1959, the United Nations adopted the Declaration on the
Rights of the Child (DRC), finding that "the child, by reason of his
physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards,
including appropriate legal protection ...."89
However, this
original resolution failed to establish an age-based definition of a
child. 90 From this starting point, the international community has
made great strides in protecting children from a variety of threats
and granting them a unique set of rights.
The Geneva Conventions of 1949, widely regarded as the
preeminent rules of armed conflict, contain two Additional
Protocols created in 1977.91 Together, they establish a minimum
acceptable age of military participation as fifteen, with enlistment
92
preference given to older children.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) took effect in 1976, and like the original DRC, failed to
establish a minimum age of legal majority. 93 However, the ICCPR

88. Roper, 543 U.S. at 576-77.
89. Declaration on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1959, G.A. Res. 1386,
U.N. Doc. A/4354 [hereinafter DRC].
90. The DRC is written vaguely, applying only to persons defined by each
individual country as children. Id.
91. Additional Protocol I to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Additional Protocol II to the
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter Protocol II].
92. Protocol I, supra note 91, at art. 77(2). These protocols, similar to their
parent treaty, have arguably fallen out of date. The proliferation of terrorist
organizations, militias, and other forms of non-traditional warfare has placed
the validity of the Geneva Conventions in question.
See Nsongurua
Udombana, War is Not Child's Play! InternationalLaw and the Prohibitionof
Children's Involvement in Armed Conflicts, 20 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 57,
73 (2006) (noting that the writers of the Fourth Geneva Convention chose
fifteen as a minimum age because "a child's faculties have generally reached a
stage of development at which there is no longer the same necessity for special
measures.") As discussed infra, this Comment will argue that this is a false
premise.
Further, the Protocols are weakly constructed, forming
recommendations more than rules. In setting a minimum age for military
recruitment, Protocol I states, "parties shall take all feasible measures" and
"shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age of 15
years into their armed forces." Id. at art. 77(2). The United States has not
ratified these additional protocols. Icrc.org, International Humanitarian LawTreaties & Documents, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView
(last visited Aug. 24, 2008).
93. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999
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promotes the special treatment of juveniles in the criminal system,
which includes keeping juveniles in separate areas and utilizing
94
juvenile imprisonment for rehabilitation only.
The United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles
Deprived of their Liberty (PJDL), created in 1990, declares anyone
under eighteen a juvenile, and states that imprisonment of a
juvenile should be a "disposition of last resort and for the
minimum necessary period and should be limited to exceptional
cases."

95

A 1999 treaty, The International Labor Organization's
Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for
the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, Convention
N.182 (ILO N.182), was the first to set the minimum age of
eighteen in relation to child soldiers. 96 It recommends the
criminalization of child soldier recruitment and categorizes the use
of child soldiers as among the worst forms of child labor. 97 The
prior year, the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court
criminalized the recruitment of child soldiers; however, it
recognized a minimum age of fifteen. 98

U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
94. Id. When dealing with a juvenile, the ICCPR states that "the procedure
shall be such as will take account of their age and the desirability of promoting
their rehabilitation." Id. at art. 14(4). The treaty further recommends that
"the penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential
aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation." Id. at art.
10(2)(b). In signing the treaty, the United States attached a limiting
reservation, which stated: "[t]he United States reserves the right, in
exceptional circumstances, to treat juveniles as adults ....
" HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD
OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 97 (2007), http://hrw.org/reports/2005/

us1005/TheRestofTheirLives.pdf [hereinafter The Rest of Their Lives].
95. United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their
Liberty, Dec. 14, 1990, G.A. Res. 45/113, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/113 [hereinafter
PJDL]. The treaty further states:
[aIll disciplinary measures constituting cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment shall be strictly prohibited, including corporal punishment,
placement in a dark cell, closed or solitary confinement or any other
punishment that may compromise the physical or mental health of the
juvenile concerned. The reduction of diet and the restriction or denial of
contact with family members should be prohibited for any purpose.
Id. at art. 67.
96. HumanRightsWatch.org, International Legal Standards Governing
Child Soldiers, http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/int-law.htm (last visited
Aug. 24, 2008).
97. International Labor Organization's Convention Concerning the
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of
Child Labor, Convention N.182 art. 3(a), June 17, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 1207
[hereinafter ILO N. 182].
98. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 2(b)(xxvi), July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. Under the definition of war crimes, the statue
lists "conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the
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The CRC emerged in 1989, in the midst of decades of
developing juvenile law. While the CRC appears to set the age of
majority at eighteen, it contains both a "catchall" clause and an
internal exception that undermines the establishment of a
categorical minimum age for military participation. 99 While the
other committee nations designing the CRC sought eighteen as the
base age for all juvenile designations, the United States resisted,
and was solely responsible for keeping the minimum age of armed
conflict participation at fifteen. 100
For eleven years, the CRC remained the fundamental
standard concerning minimum age and child soldiers. However, in
2000, the United Nations passed the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict (CRCAC).101 The main purpose of the
CRCAC was to modify Article 38 of the CRC by raising the
minimum age of military involvement to eighteen.1 02 The CRCAC
directs state parties to demobilize and release from service any
child soldier within their jurisdiction.10 3 The CRCAC further
stipulates that state parties take all necessary steps to promote
child soldiers' "physical and psychological recovery and their social
reintegration."1 0 4 While the CRCAC plays a major role regarding
the definition of child soldiers, the principles of the CRC still
dictate international consensus toward the treatment of
juveniles.105 The United States created a legal anomaly by both

national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities." Id.
99. CRC, supra note 85, at art. 1. Article 1 defines a child as "every human
being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the
child, majority is attained earlier." Id. at art. 1. Further, Article 38 reflects
verbatim Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, stating that all feasible
measures should be taken to ensure those under fifteen years of age do not
take part in military actions. Id. at art. 38.
100. American Society of International Law, United Nations: Convention on
the Rights of the Child (Commentary), 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1451 (1989). The
majority of the Working Group creating the CRC favored raising the minimum
age to eighteen from fifteen, the age set by Protocol I. Id. However, the
United States was the lone dissenter, and due to the consensus based decision

structure, the Working Group failed to raise the age. Id.
101. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, May 25, 2000, U.N. Doc. A/54/49,
G.A. Res. AJRES/54/263 [hereinafter CRCAC].
102. Id. at art. 1.
103. Id. at art. 39.
104. Id.

105. At the heart of these principles is the idea that "[i]n all actions
concerning children.., the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration." CRC, supra note 85, at art. 3. Further, "[n]o child shall be
subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment." "Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without
possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed by persons below
eighteen years of age" and "the arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child
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signing and ratifying the CRCAC, but still refraining from
ratifying its parent treaty, the CRC. Even though Omar was not
part of a state-sponsored military, the CRCAC covers him as a
fifteen year old engaged in armed combat. 106
The most recent international agreement on child soldiers
and juvenile justice is the Paris Principles. 107 This agreement goes
beyond its predecessor, the Cape Town Principles,os by providing
detailed guidelines regarding the creation and implementation of
anti-child soldier laws. 109 While the principles are non-binding,
they demonstrate a consensus of international opinion and likely
will act as a guideline for any future treaties. The Paris Principles
also confirm the minimum age of military involvement as
eighteen. 11 0 Notably, the United States did not participate in the
conference and did not sign on to the Paris Principles.111

shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used only as a measure of last
resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time." Id. at art. 37(a)-(b).
106. The CRCAC requires "armed groups that are distinct from the armed
forces of a State should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in
hostilities persons under the age of 18 years." CRCAC, supra note 101, at art.
4(1).
107. The Paris Principles are the result of a fifty-eight country conference
reviewing the Cape Town Principles in 2006 and 2007. The Paris Principles,
Feb. 7, 2007, available at http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/Paris_
ConferencePrinciplesEnglish 31 January.pdf. The Cape Town Principles,
created in 1997, promoted eighteen as the minimum age of military
recruitment. The Cape Town Principles, supra note 68.
108. Id.
109. The Paris Principles specifically addresses child soldiers accused of
crimes, stating that they should be "considered primarily as victims of offences
against international law; not as perpetrators" and must be treated within a
framework of "restorative justice and social rehabilitation."
The Paris
Principles, supra note 107, at sec. 3.6. Further, it states that, whenever
possible, "alternatives to judicial proceedings must be sought .... Id. at sec.
3.7. The Principles definitively state a position on prosecution, finding that
"children should not be prosecuted by an international court or tribunal ....
"
Id. at sec. 8.6. Likewise, they hold that "children who have been associated
with armed forces or armed groups should not be prosecuted or punished or
threatened with prosecution or punishment solely for their membership of
those forces or groups" and "children accused of crimes under international or
national law allegedly committed while associated with armed forces or armed
groups are entitled to be treated in accordance with international standards
for juvenile justice." Id. at sec. 8.8.
Additionally, in line with other international agreements on juvenile
justice, the Paris Principles find that "capital punishment or imprisonment for
life without possibility of release shall never be used against any person who is
proved to have committed an offence against international or domestic
criminal law while under 18 years of age." Id. at sec. 3.9.
110. Id. at sec. 2.1. A child associated with an armed force or armed group
refers to "any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or
used by an armed force or armed group." Id.
111. A letter from the United States Mission to the United Nations explains,
without detail, why the United States did not attend the conference, stating
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For contextual purposes, it is necessary to note that the
United States allows seventeen year olds to join the military with
parental consent. As of 2000, at least fifty thousand juveniles
joined the United States military. 112 Also worth noting is the
Child Soldiers Prevention Act, pending in the United States
Senate. 113 This act, which defines a child solider as "any person
under age 18 who takes a direct part in hostilities," seeks to limit
financial assistance to countries that recruit child soldiers and
expand services designed to rehabilitate recovered child
soldiers. 14 The United States has also expressed its stance
against child soldiers at the United Nations, voting for six Security
Council resolutions that condemn the recruitment of child soldiers
11 5
and call for the rehabilitation of former child soldiers.
B. Early Foundationsof Juvenile Culpability
in United States Case Law
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution
forbids the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishment."'1 6 This
four-word phrase has daunted United States courts for decades,
with little solid case law emerging from its decisions. 1 7 At its
roots, the Eighth Amendment draws meaning from "the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing

"[a]lthough we strongly support the overall aim of the documents, our review
identified a number of legal and policy concerns, in particular some significant
inconsistencies between the document and international legal norms
governing the issue of children in armed conflict." Letter from Carolyn
Wilson, U.S. Legal Advisor on Children in Armed Conflict, to French State
Minister
Rama
Yade
(Oct.
1,
2007),
available at
http:/!
www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/press-releases/20071001 223.html.
112. Michael Dennis, Newly Adopted Protocols to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, 94 A.J.I.L. 789, 791 (2000). However, the United States
does not allow seventeen-year-olds to participate in active armed combat. Id.
113. The Child Soldier Prevention Act, S.1175, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007);
S.3061 110th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2008).
114. Id. § 3(1)(a). The Act differentiates between those soldiers voluntarily
recruited and those forced to fight, setting the minimum age at sixteen for
voluntary enlistment. Id. § (3)(1)(c). The Act further asserts that the United
States should "expand ongoing services to rehabilitate recovered child soldiers
and to reintegrate them back into their communities by offering ongoing
psychological services to help victims recover from their trauma and relearn
how to deal with others in nonviolent ways such that they are no longer a
danger to their community." Id. § 4(3).
115. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1261 (1999), 1314 (2000),
1379 (2001), 1460 (2003), 1539 (2004) and 1612 (2005), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm.
116. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

117. In 2003, the Court stated that its precedents regarding the Eighth
Amendment have not established "a clear or consistent path for courts to
follow." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003).
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society." 118 Yet, beyond that, the courts are largely without
guidance.
Beyond the obvious pain and suffering that certain archaic
punishments inflicted,1 1 9 much of modern case law deals with a
more abstract question of proportionality-does the punishment fit
the crime? In 1989, the Court held that a "punishment should be
directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal
defendant."1 20
However, culpability (i.e., taking into account
mitigating circumstances), is historically the exclusive province of
21
cases involving the death penalty.
Presently, courts issue life sentences, often as a mandatory
punishment, without regard to age, personal background, and
other exigent circumstances.1 22 The Court first addressed the
proportionality of LWOP in Solem v. Helm, the 1983 case of a man
sentenced to LWOP under a recidivist statute for issuing a "no
account check."'123
The Court found his sentence to be
disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment and laid out three
objective factors for evaluating proportionality.124
Eight years later, in Harmelin v. Michigan, the Court again
dealt directly with the proportionality question and LWOP.
However, the Court issued a plurality opinion that remains
unresolved. The justices were split on the question of whether any
proportionally clause existed at all within the Eighth Amendment,
and if it did, to what extent; however, in the aggregate, a majority
of the justices agreed that some level of proportionality could be
125
read into the amendment.
118. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
119. For example, beheading, the electric chair, hanging, etc.
120. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989).
121. See United States v. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that
mitigating factors need only be taken into account for capital cases, and
finding a LWOP sentence issued without consideration of mitigating factors
constitutional under the Eighth Amendment). The court in LaFleurnoted and
acted in accordance with federal law providing that "whomever is guilty of
murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for
life." 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(2000).
122. Id.
123. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 281-82 (1988).
124. Id. at 290-91. These factors require a court to: (1) look to the gravity of
the offence and the harshness of the penalty; (2) compare to similar crimes
and sentences in the jurisdiction; and (3) compare to similar crimes and
sentences in other jurisdictions. Id.
125. Harmelin v. Mich., 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
In Harmelin, six justices
agreed that the sentence was constitutional; however, past that, the justices
were greatly fractured. The majority, written by Justice Scalia, held that the
Eighth Amendment contained no proportionality clause, and that the only
exception to this rule concerned the death penalty. Id. at 965. As Justice
Scalia states, "death is different." Id. at 994. Justice Kennedy, concurring in
judgment, laid out an argument for a "narrow proportionality principle," while
Justice White, dissenting, argued for a much broader proportionality clause.
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Age, as an issue of proportionality, has mostly developed in
death penalty cases. A line of case law starting in 1982 requires
that age be a mitigating factor in all capital cases. 126 In 1988, on
Eighth Amendment grounds, the Court prohibited the death
penalty for anyone fifteen years old or younger. 127 A year later,
the Court confirmed this bright line rule by upholding the capital
sentences of two juveniles, ages sixteen and seventeen. 128 While
the Court upheld the full responsibility of some juvenile offenders,
these cases laid the groundwork for diminished juvenile
culpability.
In establishing sixteen as the minimum age eligible for a
capital sentence, the Court in Thompson held that a fifteen-yearold possesses diminished capacity to care for him/herself and "is
1 29
not prepared to assume the full responsibilities of an adult."
Further, the Court acknowledged the near absolute control
parents play in a juvenile's life, and noted that, "if the parental
130
control falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae."
The Court cited extensive social science research to support the

Id. at 997 & 1009. Both Kennedy and White subscribed to the three factor test
in Solem, arguing that only sentences that are "grossly disproportionate to the
crime are barred." Id. at 1001; see Wayne Logan, Proportionality and
Punishment: Imposing Life Without Parole on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 681, 694-702 (1998) (providing a detailed comparison of the justices
opinions in Solem and Harmelin). Logan asserts that the Harmelin decision,
despite the Court's "splintered rational," provides three basic teachings. Id. at
698. First, seven of the nine justices adhere to the view that an Eighth
Amendment proportionality assessment applies to capital and non-capital
cases. Id. Second, a majority of justices found that statutorily mandated
minimum sentences of LWOP are not entitled to consideration of mitigating
factors. Id. Third, the Kennedy concurrence is the operative test for
proportionality analysis. Id.
The result has been a hybrid approach applying a proportionality
assessment in certain non-capital cases; in doing so, however, courts rarely
find the sentence to be unconstitutional. See Ewing v. Cal., 538 U.S. 11 (2003)
(holding that a sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison, imposed under a
three strikes law, was not grossly disproportionate and did not violate the
Eighth Amendment).
126. Eddings v. Okla., 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982). The Court there held that,
"the sentencer [must] not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death." Id. (emphasis in original). In other words,
mitigating factors must be allowed during the sentencing phase of a capital
trial, the harshest penalty available under the law.
127. Thompson v. Okla., 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
128. Stanford v. Ky., 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
129. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 825.
130. Id. Parenspatriaeliterally translates to "parent of his country" and is
used when the government acts on behalf of a child or mentally ill person as a
guardian. GIFIS' LAW DICTIONARY 365 (5th ed. 2003).
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statement that "youth is more than a chronological fact,"131 finding
that juveniles are highly susceptible to peer influence, 132 are
134
irresponsible, 133 are unable to evaluate long-term consequences,
135
and are not as morally reprehensible as adults.
Finally, the Court recognized that the two principle social
purposes of the death penalty, retribution and deterrence, are
inapplicable to juveniles precisely because of their diminished
culpability
and
incapacity
to
understand
long-term
136
consequences.
C. Social Science and Psychology:
The Underlying Manifestations of Adolescence
Adolescence is undoubtedly a stage of unrest. Omar's
childhood was particularly unstable - constantly on the move,
barraged by political and religious propaganda, and witness to
37
graphic violence. 1
There is general agreement that juveniles are more
susceptible to peer pressure, less able to restrain impulse and
1 38
aggression, and unable to understand long-term consequences.

131. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834.
132. Id. at 835.
Footnote forty-three of Thompson reads, "youths are
preoccupied with what they appear to be in the eyes of others as compared
with what they feel they are .... The adolescent lives in an intense present;
'now' is so real to him that past and future seem pallid by comparison." Id.
The footnote continues, "[e]verything that is important and valuable in [a
juvenile's] life lies either in the immediate life situation or in the rather close
future." Id. (internal citations omitted).
133. Id. at 834. Citing a previous case regarding mitigating circumstances,
the Court notes "minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less
mature and responsible than adults. Particularly 'during the formative years
of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective,
and judgment' expected of adults'...." Id. (internal citations omitted).
134. Id. at 835. "Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the
teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at
the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or
peer pressure than is an adult." Id. (internal citations omitted).
135. Id. at 834-35. The Court further asserts, "youth crime as such is not
exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the young also represent a failure
of family, school, and the social system, which share responsibility for the
development of America's youth .... The reasons why juveniles are not
trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why
their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an
adult...." Id. (internal citations omitted).
136. Id. at 836. The Court recognized the responsibility of society towards
juveniles, given "the teenager's capacity for growth, and society's fiduciary
obligations to its children." Id. at 837.
137. See Tietz, supra note 3 (tracing Omar's childhood).
138. See generally Kim
Taylor-Thompson,
Children, Crime, and
Consequences: Juvenile Justice in America: States of Mind/States of
Development, 14 STAN. L. & POLy REV. 143 (2003) (comparing the findings of
developmental research with conventional theories behind a juvenile and

1304

The John Marshall Law Review

[41:1281

These deficiencies largely stem from a decreased level of judgment
and decision-making capability. This line of research does not
infer that juveniles, like the criminally insane, cannot tell right
from wrong, nor does it imply that juveniles lack a structure for
cost-benefit balancing.
Instead, juveniles commit errors by
attaching "subjective values to perceived consequences" in a shortterm context, and therefore, "skew the balancing' based upon
immature judgments. 139
In other words, juveniles lack the
psychological capacity and contextual experience to make informed
decisions.140
Context, both in terms of an individual's background, and the
setting in which a crime occurs, plays a vital role in juvenile
decision-making.
An individual's upbringing lays the initial
foundation for judgment, and similarly transmits the range of
acceptable behavior in a particular environment.14 1 Likewise, the
adult justice system); Carrie S. Fried & N. Dickon Reppucci, Criminal
Decision Making: The Development of Adolescent Judgment, Criminal
Responsibility, and Culpability, 25 L. & HUMAN BEHAV. 45 (2001) (postulating
differences in the psychological factors of temporal perspective, peer influence,
and risk perception among juveniles).
139. Brief of American Medical Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the
Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL
1633549, 6 [hereinafter Brief of the AMA].
140. Professor Antoinette Clarke points to seven distinct developmental
factors affecting judgment and culpability in juveniles. Antoinette Clarke, The
Baby and the Bathwater: Adolescent Offending and Punitive Juvenile Justice
Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 659, 694-710 (2005). The factors are: (1) juveniles
lack maturity, reasoning and rationality; (2) the adolescent stage of
development is termed the "identity crisis" by researchers of identity
formation: (3) adolescents are more susceptible to peer pressure than are
adults; (4) adolescents have more uncertainty about their future, and tend to
weigh short-term consequences more heavily than long-term ones; (5)
juveniles are much less protective of their health and safety than are adults;
(6) adolescents experience changes in impulsivity and self-management
throughout the teen years; (7) the social context in which a youth exists affects
his or her emotions and motivations. Id. Another approach analyzes juveniles
along three psychosocial factors likely to affect criminal activity. ELIZABETH
CAUFFMAN AND LAURENCE STEINBERG, Researching Adolescents' Judgment
and Culpability, YOUTH ON TRIAL, A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON
JUVENILE JUSTICE 325, 331 (Thomas Grisso & Robert Schwartz eds., 2000).
The three factors are: (1) responsibility, encompassing "self-reliance, clarity of
identity, and healthy autonomy; (2) perspective, encompassing ones "ability to
understand the complexity of a situation and place it in a broader context;" (3)
temperance, encompassing "the ability to limit impulsivity and to evaluate
situations before acting." Id. (emphasis added); see also Elizabeth Cauffman
& Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why
Adolescents May be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. L. 741 (2000)
(describing in more detail the rationale and science behind their three factor
structure of analysis).
141. See R. BARRI FLOWERS, KIDS WHO COMMIT ADULT CRIMES 121-22

(2002) (describing the theory of Cultural transmission). Cultural transmission
theory asserts that juvenile delinquency is a learned behavior, adapted from
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backdrop of the crime, the immediate sense of danger, and the
larger social setting dictate how an individual will act. The
presence of a "social audience" made of one's peers, and reflective
of communal standards, raises the expectation to act within a
bounded range of action. Additionally, a juvenile's contextual
perception of an impending threat alters their reaction. 142 As will
be addressed in Part IV, the contextual circumstances of Omar's
crime are multi-layered. The battlefield setting, the expectations
placed on him by his family, his peers, and his youthful loyalty to a
radical religious dogma, all compromised his decision-making
ability.
D. Juvenile Brain Development: The Unfinished Mind
Stating
that
juveniles
temperamental, and shortsighted
bad decisions, commit crimes, and
approval, is also not news. 143

are
impulsive,
irrational,
is not news. That they make
often strive relentlessly for peer
However, finding neurological

surrounding cultural norms. Id. Three types of transmission exist: (1) vertical
transmission (transmitting norms from parent to offspring); (2) horizontal
transmission (transmitting norms from peers of the same generation); and (3)
oblique transmission (transmitting norms intergenerationally from nonparental adults). Id. Further, decision-making by juveniles is reflective of:
cumulative knowledge gained through participation in and observation
of violent interactions. This involves socialization processes that began
prior to adolescence and are refined along the way through interaction
and practice. This learning may develop into 'scripts,' which provide a
bounded set of choices to be invoked in situations where crime is a
possibility.
JEFFERY FAGAN, Contexts of Choice, YOUTH ON TRIAL, A DEVELOPMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 371, 381 (Thomas Grisso & Robert

Schwartz eds., 2000).
142. See Fagan, supra note 141, at 389 (creating an analytical structure for
context and juvenile crime). Juveniles make very poor situational judgments
and "the choice to be violent in specific situations may not be a morally good
decision, but it is a rational decision based on a calculus of the consequences of
other behavior choices." Id. Those consequences are viewed in light of their
"best and immediate interests rather than an abstract code of norms that
exists only outside the immediate context." Id. Juveniles confronted with a
choice to act or not to act in a communal arena place significant weight on
peer perception, and will act in line with the dominant social expectation in
order to protect their identity or elevate them to a desired social status. Id. at
384 (emphasis added).
143. When "crime rates are plotted against age, the rates for both prevalence
and incidence of offending appear highest during adolescence ....A steep rise
in antisocial behavior between ages seven and seventeen is mirrored by a
steep decrease in antisocial behavior between ages seventeen and thirty."
Brief of American Psychological Ass'n & the Missouri Psychological Ass'n as
Amici Curiae Supporting the Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636447, 5 [hereinafter Brief of the APA]; see
also Elizabeth Scott & Thomas Grisso, Symposium on the Future of the
Juvenile Court: The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on
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support for these known manifestations in adolescent brain
development is notable. Technological advances in brain imaging
over the last twenty years1 44 has led researchers to the ground
breaking conclusion that the brain, specifically the frontal lobe,
undergoes drastic change during the teenage years, outpaced only
145
by brain development in the first three years of life.
Generally, two major brain centers control how a person acts.
The amygdala, nestled in the core of the brain, controls basic
functions of instinct and survival, and notably, identifies and
reacts to perceived threats. 146 Actions controlled by this sector of
the brain are characterized as emotional, impulsive, and often
aggressive. 147 In contrast, the frontal lobe 148 (including the
prefrontal cortex) controls higher functioning, such as impulse
control, reasoning, perspective, and moral judgment. 149

Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 154-56 (1997)
(discussing antisocial and criminal behavior as a normal part of adolescence).
144. This includes three types of scans: (1) magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI), (2) positron emission tomography (PET), and (2) computerized axial
tomography (CAT).
145. For a comprehensive overview of the current research, see Brief of the
APA, supra note 143 (discussing psychological and biological factors affecting
juvenile culpability); Brief of the AIA, supra note 139 (discussing additional
psychological and biological factors affecting juvenile culpability); Jay D.
Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile Justice System, 13
PSYCH. PUB. POL. AND L. 115 (2007); JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER,
ADOLESCENCE, BRAIN DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL CULPABILITY (2004),

available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/Adolescence.pdf (surveying
and critiquing the current developments in brain development as they apply to
juvenile justice).
146. THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 94, at 49. Amygdala defined: "A
small oval structure in the temporal lobe of the brain ... [t]he amygdaloid
nucleus is part of the olfactory and limbic systems and plays a role in the
sense of smell, motivation, and emotional behavior." MedicineNet.com,
http://www.medterms.comscript/main/art.asp?
Definition of Amygdala,
articlekey=39203 (last visited Aug. 24, 2008).
147. The amygdala specifically regulates: "(1) emotional impulses,
particularly aggression; and (2) impulse control, risk assessment, and moral
reasoning." Brief of the AMA, supra note 139, at 12. The amygdala is a
product of evolution built to "detect danger and produce rapid protective
responses without conscious participation," and further dictates "instinctive
gut reactions, including fight or flight responses." Id. at 12-13 (emphasis
added).
148. Frontal Lobe defined: "[part of the brain] located behind the forehead
that serves to regulate and mediate the higher intellectual functions ...."
MediceneNet.com, Definition of Frontal Lobe, http://www.medterms.com/
script/main/art.asp?articlekey=25285 (last visited Aug. 24, 2008).
149. The frontal lobe is often referred to as the CEO of the brain, as it
displays executive control over various other parts. JUVENILE JUSTICE
CENTER, supra note 145, at 1. In particular, the neocortex, on top of the
frontal lobe, controls "more complex information-processing functions such as
perception, thinking, and reasoning," while the prefrontal cortex deals with
certain cognitive abilities including "decision making, risk assessment, ability
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Research in the area of juvenile brain development has
produced two significant findings: (1) the frontal lobe does not fully
develop until late in the teenage years, and (2) because the frontal
lobe acts as a "check" on the amygdala, the juvenile brain relies
heavily on the amygdala when making decisions and processing
information. 150
Research findings suggest that the brain develops literally
back to front, establishing necessary brain functions first (sensory
and survival), and leaving the higher functions until last
(reasoning and judgment).' 51 The physical development occurs in
two ways: first, there is an increase of myelin, or white matter,
around brain cells, which increases the speed and reliability of
brain communication; 15 2 second, there is a decrease in gray matter
through a process of "pruning," whereby brain cells become more
efficient. 153 Both of these sequences show measurable increases in
the frontal lobe during adolescence, while the rest of the brain
completes these two phases much earlier in childhood.154
Functional tests buttress these structural findings.
to judge future consequences, evaluating reward and punishment, behavioral
inhibition, impulse control, deception, responses to positive and negative
feedback, and making moral judgments." Brief of the AMA, supra note 139, at
13-14.
150. The frontal lobe "modulates synaptic transmissions from the
amygdala ....

A still-maturing frontal lobe exerts less control over the

amygdala and has less influence over behavior and emotions than a fully
mature frontal lobe." Id. at 14-15.
151. Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development
During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCi. U.S.

8174 (2004).
152. Myelination is the process by which "the brain's axons are coated with a
fatty white substance called myelin. Myelin surrounds the axons, which are
neural fibers that use electrical impulses to carry information across long
distances, and insulates the pathway, speeding the neural signal along the
pathway." Brief of the AMA, supra note 139, at 17.
153. Gray matter comprises the "outer surfaces, or cortices, of the brain" and
"is composed of the brain cells (or neurons) that perform the brain's tasks,
such as the cognition and higher functions that are carried out in the frontal
lobes. Like myelination, changes in gray matter are important indications of
brain maturity." Id. at 18-19. As the brain develops, there is a decrease in
gray matter through a process called pruning. Id. The pruning of gray matter
"improves the functioning of the brain's reasoning centers. Brain cells that
are not used shrivel off, thereby increasing the efficiency of the neural
system." Id. See generally Gogtay, supra note 151 (finding that brain images
examining gray matter density reveal a developmental sequence in brain
cortices, with high functioning cortices developing later in adolescence).
154. As previously occurred in the infant brain, gray matter 'blossoms" in
late childhood and early adolescence. Id. at 19-20. This gray matter must be
pruned for proper brain function, and, "as is true of myelination, the frontal
lobes are the last regions where pruning is complete." Id. Therefore, "one of
the last areas of the brain to reach full maturity, as measured by pruning, is
the part associated with regulating behavior, stifling impulses, assessing
risks, and moral reasoning." Id.
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Measuring blood flow in the brain during a particular task, a
method of demonstrating neural activity, 155 has shown a marked
difference between adult and adolescent brains. When confronted
with the same task, blood flow in adolescents increases to the
brains, the blood flows to the fully
amygdala, while in adult
156
lobe.
frontal
developed
A final area of research, combining both psychological and
neurological findings, provides an insight into how juveniles
function in high stress situations. Even if a mature sixteen-yearold is able to function rationally under calm circumstances, similar
to an adult, that same sixteen-year-old will respond drastically
different from an adult counterpart when confronted in a stressful
This difference is known as "hot" and "cold"
environment.
157
The distinction may be applied to a variety of
cognition.
criminal settings, but is especially relevant to Omar's battlefield
crime. The approaching United States soldiers had cornered an
injured Omar when he decided to make his stand. A more
stressful or "hot" setting would be difficult to imagine.
E. Juvenile Culpability in the Eyes of the Law
1.

The Roper Decision

In prohibiting the juvenile death penalty, the Supreme Court
cemented its developing views of juvenile culpability. The Court
identified three general differences between juveniles and adults
155. Robert Mathias, The Basics of Brain Imaging, http://www.nida.nih.gov/
NIDAnotes/NNVolllN5/Basics.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2008).
156. Deborah Yurgelun-Todd et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
of Facial Affect Recognition in Children and Adolescents, 38 J. AM. AcAD.
CHILD ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY

195, 195-99 (1999).

This study involved

recognizing types of facial expressions. The researchers showed adults and
adolescents pictures of people making fearful facial expressions while being
monitored in an MRI machine. Id. The results provided two interesting
findings: (1) when adolescents were shown the pictures, blood flowed to their
amygdala, while in adults, blood flowed to the frontal lobe; and (2) adults were
able to correctly identify the expressions as fearful, whereas the adolescents
often saw the faces as angry or confused. Id. This is significant because the
amygdala regulates threat responses, and, as such, confusing fear for anger,
and thereby the need for self-defense, helps psychologists to understand why
an adolescent may be more likely to lash out when confronted by an unknown
situation.
157. See Aronson, supra note 145, at 119 (stating that "the traits that are
commonly associated with being an adolescent - short-sightedness (i.e.,
inability to make decisions based on long-term planning), impulsivity,
hormonal changes, and susceptibility to peer influence - can quickly
undermine one's ability to make sound decisions in periods of hot cognition."
Id.; see also Florin Dolcos & Gregory McCarthy, Systems Mediating Cognitive
Interference by Emotional Distraction, 26 J. OF NEUROSCIENCE 2072, 2078
(2006) (establishing the brain's reliance on the frontal lobe (ventral section) for
"hot" cognition).
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that prevented those under eighteen years of age from
classification among the "worst offenders," worthy of the law's
158
harshest punishment.
First, they found that juveniles lack maturity and have an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility. 159 Second, they recognized
that juveniles are more susceptible to "negative influences and
outside pressures, including peer pressure."'160 Last, the court
noted that the character of a juvenile is "not as well formed as that
of an adult."161 Based on these three differences, the Court found
that the antisocial and criminal conduct of juveniles is "not as
62
morally reprehensible as that of an adult."'
With this conclusion in mind, the Court analyzed the two
purposes of punishment, retribution and deterrence, and found
that the intent and policy behind each could not be applied as
163
justification for the juvenile death penalty.
In an uncommon move, while looking at the national
consensus for the juvenile death penalty, the Court referenced
international law and practice.164 The Court acknowledged that
the group of countries that execute juveniles -ispoor company for
the United States to be in,1 65 and further noted the relevant

158. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
159. The court additionally held that "these qualities often result in
impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions ....It has been noted that
adolescents are overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of
In recognition of the comparative immaturity and
reckless behavior ....
irresponsibility of juveniles, almost every State prohibits those under 18 years
of age from voting, serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent."
Id. at 569.
160. The court further noted that a juvenile's own "vulnerability and
comparative lack of control over their immediate surroundings means
juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape
negative influences in their whole environment." Id. at 570 (emphasis added).
161. Id.
162. The Court concluded that a juvenile's transitory identity meant "it is
less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a
juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character. From a moral
standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those
of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor's characterdeficiencies
will be reformed." Id. (emphasis added).
163. "Retribution is not proportional if the law's most severe penalty is
imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a
Id. at 571.
substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity."
Concerning deterrence, the Court questioned if the death penalty had any
effect on juvenile deterrence, and held that "the absence of evidence of
deterrent effect is of special concern because the same characteristics that
render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will
be less susceptible to deterrence." Id.
164. Id. at 575-78.
165. Since 1990, only Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, China, and the United States have executed
juveniles. Since then, all of these countries except the United States have
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standards laid out by the CRC and the ICCPR prohibiting capital
punishment for those under the age of eighteen. 166 While the court
made clear that international law was not binding, it stated that
such laws are instructive in interpreting what is cruel and
167
unusual under the Eighth Amendment.
While it was not the subject of the case, the Roper Court
addressed the punishment of LWOP briefly. Initially, the court
acknowledges LWOP as an alternative to the death penalty, but
not without qualifying the severity of such a punishment for a
juvenile. 168 Following that, LWOP is only addressed again in the
dissent. After lambasting the majority for their deference to
international law, Justice Scalia notes that, to be consistent with
the referenced international treaties, the United States would
69
need to outlaw juvenile LWOP along with the death penalty.
2. Juvenile Life Without Parole
Presently in the United States, at least 2,255 prisoners are
serving LWOP for crimes they committed as juveniles. 170 The

officially prohibited the practice. Id. at 577.

166. Id.
167. The Court took particular notice of the United Kingdom due to the
"historic ties between our countries and in light of the Eighth Amendment's
own origins." Id. The United Kingdom no longer uses capital punishment;
however, before its total ban, the United Kingdom outlawed the juvenile death
penalty in 1948. Id. at 577-78.
168. "To the extent the juvenile death penalty might have residual deterrent
effect, it is worth noting that the punishment of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young
person." Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
169. Justice Scalia states:
in addition to barring the execution of under-18 offenders, the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child prohibits punishing them
with life in prison without the possibility of release. If we are truly
going to get in line with the international community, then the Court's
reassurance that the death penalty is really not needed, since "the
punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is
itself a severe sanction," ante, at 1196, gives little comfort.
Id. at 623.
170. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 86, at 5. Additionally, an
estimated fifty-nine percent of these sentences were given to first time
offenders.
Elizabeth Cepparulo, Roper v. Simmons: Unveiling Juvenile
Purgatory: Is Life Really Better Than Death? 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 225, 248 (2006). The rate of juvenile LWOP sentences has increased
three-fold in the past fifteen years. Id. This increase mirrors a short-term
rise in violent juvenile crime, and the continued sustainability of juvenile
crime as a political issue. See THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 94, at 1415 (detailing the rise of violent crime in the 1980s and the belief that juvenile
offenders were becoming "super predators"). See generally Victor Streib &
Bernadette Schrempp, Life Without Parole For Children, 21 CRIM. JUST. 4
(2007) (surveying the current status of juvenile LWOP on the federal and state
level). Forty-two states allow for juvenile LWOP, while only four states
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Supreme Court has yet to take up the issue of juvenile LWOP
under an Eighth Amendment analysis. However, the Ninth and
Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal have each confirmed the
constitutionality of such sentences. 171 Both courts gave deference
to the state legislatures and found the sentences to be proportional
to the crimes. 172 Notably, one of the only courts to find a juvenile
173
LWOP sentence unconstitutional is the Nevada Supreme Court.
It found LWOP grossly disproportionate for a thirteen-year-old
174
that killed a man who was allegedly molesting him.

nationwide prohibit LWOP for all offenders. Hillary Massey, Disposing of
Children:The Eight Amendment and Juvenile Life Without ParoleAfter Roper,
46 B.C. L. REV. 1083, 1089 (2006).
171. Rice v. Cooper, 148 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 1998); Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d
581 (9th Cir. 1996).
172. In Rice, a mildly retarded sixteen-year-old, at the goading of his peers,
threw a lit bottle of gasoline into an apartment building, killing four residents.
Rice, 148 F.3d at 749. He was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced
to LWOP under a mandatory provision. Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his
sentence, stating:
we cannot find any basis in decisions interpreting the Eighth
Amendment, or in any other source of guidance to the meaning of "cruel
and unusual punishments," for concluding that the sentence in this case
It was not disproportionate to the
was unconstitutionally severe.
crime ... society attaches moral significance to consequences as well as
to states of mind ...Rice was morally responsible in the further sense of
having sufficient mental capacity to form the intent required to be found
guilty of the crime.
Id. at 752.
In Harris, the fifteen-year-old defendant and a friend robbed a drugstore,
during which the friend shot and killed the storeowner. Harris, 93 F.3d at
582. Harris was convicted of aggravated felony murder and sentenced to
mandatory LWOP. Id. The Ninth Circuit upheld the sentence, first giving
deference to the Washington legislature, and then finding that:
if we put mandatory life imprisonment without parole into a unique
constitutional category, we'll be hard pressed to distinguish mandatory
life with parole; the latter is nearly indistinguishable from a very long,
mandatory term of years... Youth has no obvious bearing on this
problem: If we can discern no clear line for adults, neither can we for
youths ... [Miandatory life imprisonment without parole is, for young
and old alike, only an outlying point on the continuum of prison
raises no inference of disproportionality when imposed
sentences ...[I]t
on a murderer.
Id. at 583.
173. Naovarath v. Nevada, 779 P.2d 944 (Nev. 1989).
174. Id. The opinion written by the Nevada Supreme Court captures the
arguments made by juvenile advocates seeking to prohibit juvenile LWOP.
The opinion starts by recognizing what LWOP means to a seventh grader,
stating, "[d]enial of this vital opportunity means denial of hope; it means that
good behavior and character improvement are immaterial" and that, "the
killing, taken together with the mental and moral status of the boy, render
Naovarath, at thirteen, permanently unregenerate and an unreclaimable
danger to society who must be caged until he dies." Id. at 945-46.
The court further notes that the defendant could be "the beginning of an
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The United States legal system has never dealt with a child
soldier, and is slowly (and painfully) carving out its own version of
laws regarding non-state foreign fighters. In Omar's case, his
actions did not take place in a vacuum, and if he were in the
United States court system, his situation likely would be one of the
"exceedingly rare" cases in which a proportionality analysis
applies.175
IV. PROPOSAL
A recent study demonstrated that adults believe juveniles'
developmental immaturity influences their criminal choices, and
therefore, they attribute less culpability to them according to their
age.1 76 Yet, the actual application of juvenile justice does not
mirror this consensus. Currently, the political rhetoric driving
"get tough" juvenile crime policies is outdone only by political
vengeance against terrorists. 177 Omar, unfortunately, falls into
both of these figurative categories, and therefore, the legal
question of his culpability has been set aside time and time again.

irremediably dangerous adult human being, but we certainly cannot know
that fact with any degree of certainty now. If putting this child away until his
death is not cruel, it is certainly unusual." Id. at 947. The opinion continues,
stating, "to adjudicate a thirteen-year-old to be forever irredeemable and to
subject a child of this age to hopeless, lifelong punishment and segregation is
not a usual or acceptable response to childhood criminality, even when the
criminality amounts to murder." Id.
The Nevada court, like the court in Roper, looked at the two purposes of
punishment, retribution and deterrence, and found that lifetime incarceration
of a seventh grader cannot measurably contribute to the social purposes of
punishment. Id. at 948. Regarding retribution, the court acknowledged the
right of the state to seek retribution against a juvenile. Id. However, because
of the "undeniably lesser culpability of children for their bad actions, their
capacity for growth and society's special obligation to children, almost anyone
will be prompted to ask whether Naovarath deserves the degree of retribution
represented by the hopelessness of a life sentence without possibility of
parole." Id. In reference to deterrence, the court observed, "it is questionable
as to whether a thirteen-year-old can even imagine or comprehend what it
means to be imprisoned for sixty years or more." Id.
175. The Court still holds that "outside the context of capital punishment,
successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been
exceedingly rare." Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
176. Elizabeth Scott et al., Public Attitudes About the Culpability and
Punishment of Young Offenders, 24 BEHAV. Sci. L. 815 (2006).
177. Interestingly, the juvenile crime rates of the 1980s, which produced the
"get tough" crime laws, have declined. Streib, supra note 170, at 4. In 2002,
the juvenile murder rate fell to its lowest point since 1984. Id. Importantly,
approximately thirty-nine percent of those juveniles committed their crimes in
concert with an adult. Id.
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A. Omar as a Child
Stripping away Omar's terrorist label, he was a child at the
time of the incident, facing the same psychological and
neurological impairments as any other. And, as a child solider in a
war zone, the effects of his underdeveloped mind are exacerbated.
The peer pressure put upon him to engage in immoral and illegal
behavior was three-fold-coming from his peer group, unrelated
adults, and, most importantly, his own family. 7 8 Further, the
scene of Omar's capture defines a high stress environment that
179
invariably intensified his impulsive behavior.
Before the military air strike, several adults accompanied
Omar and were likely dictating his actions. After the bombing
killed them, Omar was alone, trapped, and suffering from a head
injury.
Omar's aggressive reaction, lack of reasoning, and
impulsive decision to strike out are characteristic of juveniles in
far less overwhelming situations. 80 Last, because juveniles lack a
mental framework for processing long-term consequences,' 8 ' Omar
could not have conceived in those moments the personal
ramifications that might result from his choice.
His
understanding of the possible consequences failed to reach past
the immediate moment after he threw his grenade. Due to these
deficiencies, Omar, and juveniles generally, cannot be held on
equal footing with their adult counterparts.
B. Omar as a Juvenile Offender
Omar's situation, while extreme, is reflective of the problems
that plague the United States juvenile justice system. If the
United States tried Omar in the federal criminal system, the court
would not consider the mitigating circumstances of his crime
during sentencing, and for a charge of first-degree murder, he
would receive mandatory LWOP.182
178. See generally McKenna, supra note 2; Tietz, supra note 3; Vincent,
supra note 8 (detailing Omar's childhood, family background, and living
environment). See also FLOWERS, supra note 141, at 121-22 (discussing the
Cultural Transmission theory and crime as a learned behavior).
179. See Tietz, supra note 3 (describing the details of Omar's fire-fight and
capture).
180. See Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 148 (discussing the difficulty juveniles
have distinguishing between facial expressions showing fear and anger).
181. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 130; Clarke, supra note 132 (detailing
developmental deficiencies in juveniles related to processing long-term
consequences).
182. If Omar were transferred to a United States court, they would try him
in the federal system. Under federal law, LWOP is mandatory for first-degree
murder. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2000). Likewise, LWOP is mandatory in twentysix states for anyone found guilty of first-degree murder, regardless of age.
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Before Roper, a juvenile charged with murder and eligible for
the death penalty would have his entire background taken into
account during the sentencing phase.18 3 In such cases, where
neither death nor LWOP were mandatory, consideration of those
factors might lead to a sentence including parole. However, with
the abolition of the juvenile death penalty, a court will not
consider mitigating factors for the maximum sentence of LWOP.
Therefore, a court will issue the harshest punishment available to
a juvenile, guaranteed death in prison, regardless of circumstances
that may have modified the then harshest possible punishment in
the past.18 4 A maximum punishment for any crime is an outlier,
and necessitates special circumstances for its application.
Therefore, regardless of whether the maximum is death or not, a
comprehensive and reflective process should accompany any
disposition involving the harshest penalty available.
There is no doubt that here and abroad, juveniles are capable
of horrible acts.185 However, lawmakers must draw a line between
their physical capabilities and their mental culpability. Further,
lawmakers cannot overlook the responsibility of society and family
towards juveniles. By permanently locking up a juvenile, we not
only abandon hope for recovery, we also fail to understand why,
HumanRightsWatch.org, United States: Thousands of Children Sentenced to
Life Without Parole, Oct. 12, 2005, http:/Jhrw.org/english/docs/2005/10/12/
usdoml1835.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2008).
183. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110.
184. It cannot be overlooked how harsh of a punishment LWOP is for a
juvenile. A fifteen-year-old sentenced to LWOP may face seventy years or
more in jail, knowing they will die within the prison walls. For some, this
"slow death" may be worse than a death sentence. See Cepparulo, supra note
158, at 249 (quoting a sixteen-year-old spared from a death sentence by Roper
as saying, "I wish I still had a death sentence. I believe my chances have gone
down the drain. No one will ever look at my case ... this is hopeless."). Id.
185. Besides cases mentioned in this Comment, the past decade is flush with
examples. The Columbine shooters were seventeen and eighteen at the time
of their deadly rampage. See generally Katie Hammett, School Shootings,
Ceramic Tiles, and Hazelwood: The Continuing Lessons of the Columbine
Tragedy, 55 ALA. L. REV. 393 (2004) (recounting the shooting's events and
participants). Additionally, and more analogous to Omar, John Lee Malvo was
seventeen when he and a forty two year old accomplice, John Muhammad,
killed ten people in 2002. Malvo stated that Muhammad had brainwashed
him from the time they met when Malvo was fifteen. Malvo: Muhammad
'Made Me a Monster,' CNN, May 23, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/
05/23/sniper.triallindex.html?section=cnnlaw (last visited Aug. 24, 2008).
The Department of Justice initially tried Malvo in Virginia because, at the
time, it had the juvenile death penalty. However, a jury sentenced Malvo to
LWOP. Lisa Bacon, Judge Affirms Life Sentence for Teenager in WashingtonArea Sniper Killings, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 2004, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gstlfullpage.html?res=9BO6E7D9123EF932A25750C
0A9629C8B63. Notably, his trial was proceeding at the same time the Roper
case was moving towards the Supreme Court, and had the jury sentenced him
to death, the Roper decision would have commuted his sentence.
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and due to what extenuating circumstances, a juvenile is able to
commit such a heinous act. A sentence to die in jail is at best
speculative of what a juvenile might one day become, and, at
18 6
worst, an absolute bar to any positive life he or she could lead.
Every time a court finds a juvenile guilty of murder, the state
should launch an additional inquiry into what caused the juvenile
to kill, and, importantly, what circumstance allowed him or her to
do it.1 s 7 To this end, Omar could never have ended up where he
did without the facilitation of his family and community-they
bear the great weight of his actions.
C. Omar as a Child Solider
The CRCAC is the most current, specific, and widely ratified
treaty on child soldiers. Because Omar committed his crimes at
the age of fifteen, on the battlefield, and under the flag of a nonstate militant organization, the CRCAC classifies him as a child
solider.1 88 Neither the CRCAC,189 nor the more detailed Paris
Principles, 190 distinguish between juveniles forcibly recruited and
those that appear to have joined voluntarily. Omar's apparent
186. See Ellen Marrus & Irene Merker Rosenberg, After Roper v. Simmons:
Keeping Kids of Out of Criminal Court, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1151, 1180
(2005) (discussing the "fundamentally low reliability" of clinically predicting

future criminal activity and reporting on a study which found psychiatric
predictions of criminal activity wrong in two thirds of cases).
187. Currently, a person under eighteen is either tried in a juvenile or adult
criminal court-an often black or white distinction that can have drastic
consequences. To meditate the harshness of this dichotomy, the United States
should add an intermediate juvenile court, designed to try juveniles accused of
very serious crimes. However, this court would not be beholden to mandatory
sentencing guidelines and could take into account factors diminishing the
culpability of the offender. See Barry Feld, Symposium on the Future of the
Juvenile Court: Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal
Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68 (1997)
(advocating a youth sentencing policy separate from the current system which
incorporates a "categorical youth discount" and that recognizes a juvenile's
diminished culpability); see also Greg Jones & Michael Connelly, Maryland
State Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy - Update on Blended
Sentences, http://www.msccsp.org/publications/blended.html (last visited Aug.
24, 2008) (reviewing the concept and usage of "blended sentencing," which
creates hybrid sentences between the juvenile and adult criminal system).
Such a system allows an offender to be tried in juvenile court, serve his initial
sentence in a juvenile facility, and in the case of a serious offender, have
certain years of adult prison time added on. Id.
188. CRCAC, supra note 101, at art. 4.
189. Article 4 states, "[airmed groups that are distinct from the armed forces
of a State should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities
persons under the age of 18 years." Id.
190. Section 2.1 defines a child associated with an armed force or armed
group as any person "below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or
used by an armed force or armed group .... Paris Principles, supra note 107,
at sec. 2.1 (emphasis added).
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willingness to kill an American soldier cannot be viewed outside of
his age, background, and the setting of his crime-all of which
reduce his culpability.
While the United States has signed the CRCAC, it relies
heavily on the Geneva Conventions to argue its "war on terror"
policies, including the justification for Omar's detention. 191 The
Geneva Conventions and their subsequent Additional Protocols
are in need of serious reform to meet the changing needs of a legal
system confronted by international terrorism. Additionally, and
more relevant to the case at hand, the United Nations must bring
the Geneva Conventions in line with the CRCAC to firmly
establish eighteen as the age of military majority and adulthood.
Amending the Geneva Conventions in this manner would solidify
the international consensus on child soldiers and provide much
needed legitimacy and weight to the global effort to prevent
further child soldier recruitment.
From the start, Omar's classification as a child soldier
entitled him to a multitude of rights and accommodations that he
never received, including oversight of the nature and length of his
detention, and access to counsel and family. 192
Omar's
classification currently entitles him to legal treatment different
from those that committed their crimes as adults, a general
disposition as a victim over a perpetrator, and access to a
psychological rehabilitation program. 193 Likewise, international
law forbids him from ever receiving a LWOP sentence. 194
D. Omar as a Prisoner
Looking back, there were flaws in how the United States
handled Omar from the beginning. Upon capturing him, the
United States could have released Omar to the Canadian
government, released him to a rehabilitation program in
Afghanistan, 95 or held him in a proper juvenile facility within the

191. See Bellinger, supra note 55 (citing the Geneva Conventions and its
Additional Protocols to support detaining Omar with adults and prosecuting
him for his actions). Notably, however, Mr. Bellinger states, "[w]e have --and
consistent with our international agreements - treat individuals as children
detained in armed conflict as individuals under 16." Id. This classification,
which strays from the Additional Protocol's minimum age of fifteen, defines
Omar as a child at the time of his crimes. Mr. Bellinger appears to look past
this fact, and only references his age at the time he reached Guantanamo Bay.

Id.
192. See generally CRCAC, supra note 101; ICCPR, supra note 93; PJDL,
supranote 95 (identifying specific rights given to minors).
193. Id.; Paris Principles, supra note 107.
194. CRC, supra note 85, at art. 37(a); Paris Principles, supra note 107, at
sec. 3.9.
195. UNICEF established an Afghanistan-based demobilization and
reintegration program in February 2004. COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF
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United States. Regardless of these options, he should never have
gone to Guantanamo Bay.
Beyond the obvious question of
96
whether any prisoner should be at Guantanamo Bay,
international law clearly prohibits a state from holding a juvenile
in an adult facility without access to legal counsel or his family.197
Because Omar was a juvenile, the United States had a duty to
process him as quickly as possible, 198 and not let him languish for
six years before bringing him up on charges. If the United States
had processed Omar in due time, the government could have tried
him as a juvenile and allowed him to serve any prison sentence in
a juvenile facility, or, allowed him to participate in a juvenile
rehabilitation program while still the appropriate age.
Looking backward, however, only helps those that will follow
in Omar's footsteps. 199 Omar, now twenty-two, faces a legal
conundrum. He has served over six years at Guantanamo Bay and
is too old for any juvenile program. His time in detention has
undoubtedly sealed in any anger and animosity towards the
United States that was planted in his brain during his
childhood. 200 At the time of his capture, Omar's chances of
rehabilitation and reintegration were far higher for precisely the
same reasons he was so susceptible to negative environmental
influences -juveniles are impressionable, both to their benefit and
to their detriment. Omar's brother, Abdurahman, is a perfect

CHILD SOLDIERS, CHILD SOLDIERS GLOBAL REPORT 2004 (2004), available at
http://www.child-soldiers.org/documentget.php?id=843.
In February 2003, the NGO Consortium for the Psychosocial Care and
Protection of Children received funding from the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) to assist at-risk children, including
former child soldiers. Id.
196. See Ronald D. Rotunda, The Detainee Cases of 2004 and 2006 and Their
Aftermath, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (2006) (discussing the relevant Supreme
Court cases and federal legislation applicable to prisoners held at
Guantanamo Bay and their legal implications). See also Tung Yin, Coercion
and Terrorism Prosecutions in the Shadow of Military Detention, 2006 BYU L.
REV. 1255 (2006) (discussing the actions of the Executive Branch relating to
the determination and detention of enemy combatants).
197. See generally CRCAC, supra note 101; ICCPR, supra note 93; PJDL,
supra note 95 (codifying a minor's right to access family, legal counsel, and be
held separate from the adult population).
198. Paris Principles, supra note 107, at sec. 8.10.
199. For a discussion of those following in Omar's footsteps see
GlobalPolicy.org and Zavis & Therolf, supra note 77 (reporting the high rate of
juveniles that United States soldiers are encountering in both Iraq and
Afghanistan). The opportunity to act properly has also already passed for
Mohammed Jawad since the military has detained him for several years and
he has already been charged. Williams, supra note 52. However, the case
against Jawad is even weaker than Omar's since his actions as a juvenile did
not result in a death. Id.
200. Interestingly, in May 2007, Omar fired both his American attorneys.
Ahmad, supra note 43, at 6 n.22.
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example of this, as he walked away from the lifestyle at the age of
nineteen. 201 Likewise, Omar's younger brother, Abdul, provides
the counter point to Abdurahman: after being shot and paralyzed
during a firefight at the age of fourteen, he voiced his displeasure
at not becoming a martyr; but only four years later he had given
up this wish and was living peacefully in Canada. 202 Four years is
a lifetime for a juvenile in terms of perspective and independence.
However, by the time Omar turned nineteen, the United States
had held him under questionably dangerous conditions for four
years, with no apparent end in sight.
E. Omar as a Defendant
The United States has also failed Omar by trying him in the
same manner as other military prisoners. Since his arrival, Omar
has had no special treatment for his age, and his judicial
proceedings are no different.
If the United States finds it necessary to prosecute a child
solider, a more appropriate option available is a juvenile-only
court. The government of Sierra Leone attempted, but failed, in
2000, to create a juvenile chamber to prosecute fifteen to eighteenyear-olds charged with war crimes. 20 3 The proposal for the
juvenile chamber included a variety of additional safeguards, but,
most importantly, specified rehabilitation and reintegration as the
goals of the proceedings-not prison time. 204 By establishing a
201. See Frontline,supra note 31 (detailing Abdurahman's desire to leave his
family).
202. 60 Minutes, supra note 38. Shortly after Omar fell into United States
custody, his father and younger brother engaged in a firefight with the
Pakistani military. Id. Omar's father was killed, and Abdul was shot in the
Confined to a wheel chair and home in
back, leaving him paralyzed. Id.
Canada in 2004, then the same age as Omar at his capture, Abdul described
the "paradise" of seventy-two virgins he missed by not dying for Islam. Id. He
further states he wanted to become a suicide bomber, telling his father "just
give me a belt, and I will blow myself up. I'll go and just do anything." Id.
Three years later, now eighteen, Abdul still lives in Canada and no longer
speaks of his missed opportunity or dreams of becoming suicide bomber. Id.
203. See Diane Marie Amann, Calling Children to Account: The Proposalfor
a Juvenile Chamber in the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 29 PEPP. L. REV.
167 (2001) (analyzing and discussing United Nations Secretary-General Kofi
Annan's proposal for a juvenile chamber amendment to the Statute for the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137).
204. The proposed chamber would operate under the assumption that a
juvenile should be "treated with dignity and a sense of worth, taking into
account his or her young age and the desirability of promoting his or her
rehabilitation, reintegration into and assumption of a constructive role in
society." Amann, supra note 203, at 173.
If a trial was necessary, it was to be held entirely separate from any adult
prisoners, and "at least one sitting judge and one alternate judge possessing
the required qualifications and experience in juvenile justice" would hear the
case. Id. at 174.
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juvenile court, staffed with justices knowledgeable on juvenile
matters and child soldiers, the special court would facilitate the
goals of serving justice through adjudication and protecting the
rights and long-term interests of the child.
In the alternative to a formal judicial proceeding, a "truth and
reconciliation" forum might likewise serve the beneficial purpose
of bringing the wrongs committed to light while providing a
positive environment for understanding between the offender and
the victims. 20 5 Exposing Omar to the Speer family could have
aided Omar in understanding the dire ramifications of his actions
and helped the Speer family grasp the immaturity of Sergeant
Speer's killer and the circumstances surrounding his life.
V.

CONCLUSION

What is the purpose of trial and punishment? United States
law recognizes retribution and deterrence as the principle goals justice for the bereaved and a message of warning to those who
may commit the same crime. For a juvenile offender, and even
more so for a child soldier, these goals are less applicable. The
principle question behind the United States prosecuting Omar, or
any child soldier, is whether trying and imprisoning him will deter
future child soldiers seven thousand miles away? The answer,
simply put, is no.
The forces at work on child soldiers in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere are far more powerful than
United States criminal policy. Regardless of what acts a child
commits as the result of these forces, the United States should
treat them presumptively as victims over perpetrators. When the
United States military comes in contact with child soldiers, its
goal should be to take the action that the children themselves
cannot: remove them from their hostile environments and help
Instead of issuing a sentence, the juvenile chamber would issue a
"disposition" in line with "rehabilitative means such as supervision or
community service, counseling, foster care, and participation in correctional,
Id.
educational, training, disarmament, and reintegration programs."
Currently, at least one justice with significant juvenile experience sits on the
Sc-sl.org, The Special Court for Sierra Leone Special Court's bench.
Chambers, Justice Renate Winter, http://www.sc-sl.org/chambers.html (last
visited Aug. 24, 2008).
205. A truth and reconciliation commission seeks to establish a complete
picture of the causes, nature and extent of any gross violations of human
rights that occurred during an armed conflict, including the perspectives of the
victims and perpetrators. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act,
South Africa (1995), available at http://www.doj.gov.za/trcflegal/act9534.htm.
Such a commission may further grant amnesty to those who give full
disclosure of their acts and motives, be they political, cultural, or otherwise.
Id.; see also Nienke Grossman, Rehabilitationor Revenge: Prosecuting Child
Soldiers for Human Rights Violations, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 323, 351-52 (2007)
(discussing various venues for juvenile justice and describing the
requirements for a truth and reconciliation commission).
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them regain what little childhood they have left.
Omar cannot shoulder the blame of his actions alone. At
fifteen, he was a product of his environment, and lacked the
resources, the moral motivation, and the developmental
capabilities to escape the circumstances that placed him on a
battlefield in the Afghan countryside. The United States juvenile
justice policy needs to take a step forward by eliminating LWOP
for those under eighteen and returning to a more culpabilitybased, rehabilitation-focused sentencing policy. Last, the United
States must sign and support all relevant international law
governing child soldiers and help set a worldwide example to
ensure that gross violations of human rights do not continue to
occur.

